The link between asset valuations and investor sentiment is the subject of considerable debate in the profession. We address this question by examining how survey data on investor sentiment relates to i) long-horizon returns, and ii) asset valuations. If excessive optimism drives prices above intrinsic values, periods of high sentiment should be followed by low returns as market prices revert to fundamental values. We find this to be the case for the overall stock market at horizons of two to three years. The relation is strongest for large-capitalization, low book-to-market (growth) portfolios. We also examine the relation between sentiment levels and deviations from intrinsic value. Using errors from an independent pricing model, we find sentiment is positively related to valuation errors using a variety of tests. All of our results are robust to the inclusion of other factors that have been shown to forecast stock returns, including past returns. 
Introduction
A long-running debate in financial economics concerns the possible effect of investor sentiment on asset prices. For example, respected researchers have entered on both sides of the argument as to whether the stock price run-up and subsequent market collapse of 1929 was rational or not [see DeLong and Shleifer (1991) and White (1990) ]. Perhaps "irrational exuberance" [Shiller (2000) ] drove prices above fundamental values. More recently, some commentators have suggested the rapid rise and fall of technology stocks was due to excessively bullish sentiments that started returning to more typical levels in the spring of 2000.
Indeed, even before the massive devaluation of technology stocks, Malkiel (1999) 
wrote
The spreading philosophy of the day traders that "fundamentals don't matter" may well have contributed to valuations of Internet stocks that can only be described in terms of a financial bubble.
The existence of systematic mispricing in the market remains contentious because of the difficulty in examining the issue empirically. 1 The absence of precise valuation models for stocks makes it difficult to measure deviations from theoretical prices. Similar problems arise from the difficulty in measuring investor sentiment.
Several recent papers identify examples which are difficult to reconcile with rational pricing. Lamont and Thaler (2001) examine 3Com's spinoff of Palm. In this transaction, the market valuations of the companies implied the 3Com "stub" (a 3Com share less the claim on Palm) was -$63, a violation of the law of one price. Rashes (2001) discusses the heavy trading in Massmutual Corporate Investors (ticker MCI) around Worldcom's acquisition of MCI Communications (ticker MCIC). Apparently these investors were unable to determine the correct ticker symbol and mistakenly placed trades in Massmutual, and their trading drove the price away from its intrinsic value. Ofek and Richardson (2001) discuss a variety of examples from the Internet sector in developing a "strong, circumstantial case against market efficiency." While these papers provide interesting evidence of misvaluation, they are specific to either a few companies or to an industry which is admittedly difficult to value.
Our focus in this paper is at the level of broad market indices.
We shed new light on the issue of investor rationality by bringing new data and techniques to the question. Specifically, we use a direct survey measure of investor sentiment instead of relying on other proxies such as closed-end fund discounts [see Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) , Swaminathan (1996) , and Neal and Wheatley (1998) ]. Perhaps the most important distinction between our paper and most prior research is that our empirical tests concentrate on relating sentiment levels directly to stock price deviations from fundamental value and on the long-run effects of sentiment on stock returns. 2 Shanken and Tamayo (2001) provide evidence of expected return predictability which is unrelated to risk. They characterize this predictability as being due to mispricing. Their analysis uses a slow-moving variable (the dividend yield) as the conditioning information, implying that mispricing may be a long-horizon phenomenon.
Intuitively, looking at the relation between long-run market returns and sentiment is appealing for two reasons. First, it seems natural to view sentiment as a persistent variable.
People become more optimistic as they are reinforced by others joining on the bandwagon.
Thus, the importance of sentiment may build over time. Second, arbitrage forces are likely to eliminate short-run mispricing, but may break down at longer horizons. Two examples of the limits to arbitrage are the noise trader risk of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990, hereafter DSSW) and the interaction of agency costs and capital constraints in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . Indeed, sentiment appears to have little predictive power for subsequent near-term returns (see the papers cited in Footnote 2). This result is not surprising since short-run predictability would lead to a simple trading strategy generating abnormal returns.
However, the lack of predictability in the short run does not imply that sentiment has no 2 Solt and Statman (1988) , Clarke and Statman (1998) , Otoo (1999) , Fisher and Statman (2000) , and Brown and Cliff (2002) also use survey data, but focus on the short-run implications. Neal and Wheatley (1998) do long-horizon regressions, but use proxies for sentiment.
affect on prices. Sentiment may drive asset prices away from intrinsic value for extended periods of time, yet this would be difficult to detect over short horizons [see Summers (1986) ].
Whether sentiment does affect asset valuations in this way is an important open question which we address in this paper.
We test two main hypotheses. The first is that excessive optimism leads to periods of market overvaluation. If so, this leads to the second hypothesis that high current sentiment is followed by low cumulative long-run returns as the market price reverts to its intrinsic value.
If the price correction were quick and predictable, there would be a potentially profitable trading strategy. However, a gradual correction over some unknown horizon is possible if there are limits to arbitrage. For example, an arbitrageur may believe with high confidence that the market is overvalued, but be unwilling to take a short position for fear the market may become more overvalued before reverting to its intrinsic value. Frequent performance evaluation exacerbates this problem since investors may withdraw capital precisely at the time when it is needed to meet margin calls.
To test our first hypothesis we relate the level of sentiment to market mispricing as proxied by the S&P 500 pricing errors from Bakshi and Chen (2001) . Estimating the relation between sentiment and mispricing is econometrically challenging because both time series are highly persistent. We undertake two types of tests, each of which yields similar conclusions in support of the hypothesis that sentiment is related to market mispricing. The first test uses the level of sentiment to explain pricing errors. We find a significantly positive coefficient on the sentiment variable, indicating the market is overvalued during periods of optimism. A second test treats the market and model valuations as a cointegrated system. Sentiment is a significant explanatory variable in the error correction version of the cointegrating regression. That is, after controlling for changes in fundamental value and the error-correction adjustment towards equilibrium, sentiment is positively related to changes in market valuations. Both sets of tests are robust to controlling for other factors predicting market returns (e.g., past returns, dividend yield, Fama-French factors, etc.).
In the test of our second hypothesis we find that sentiment is in fact significantly related to long-run stock returns in the manner predicted. Specifically, high levels of sentiment result in significantly lower returns over the next two or three years. While this effect is present for the aggregate stock market, it is concentrated in large-capitalization growth stocks. The economic significance of this result is also plausible. For example, a one standard deviation (bullish) shock to sentiment results in a predicted 7% underperformance of the market over the next three years. These results are robust to inclusion of the control variables and the econometric issues related to overlapping observations. Together these three tests provide strong and consistent support for the hypothesis that asset values are affected by investor sentiment. Each of the tests provides both statistically and economically significant results all pointing in the same direction. Namely, that overly optimistic (pessimistic) investors drive prices above (below) fundamental values and that these pricing errors tend to revert over a multi-year horizon. This pattern is consistent with the predictions of many behavioral models that prices underreact in the short run and overreact in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some motivation for the paper and our approach. Section 3 discusses the data. The next two sections contain our main analysis. Section 4 covers the long-horizon regressions and Section 5 examines the relation between sentiment and the mispricing implied by the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model. In Section 6 we present a number of robustness checks and comparisons to other empirical findings using alternative sentiment proxies. Section 7 concludes the paper and an Appendix contains the details of the simulation used with the long-horizon regressions.
Motivation
In this section we develop our hypotheses by discussing an environment where sentiment can affect asset valuation. Our approach makes three main assumptions. First, we assume that a subset of investors makes biased asset valuations. Second, we assume that this bias is persistent. Finally, we assume that there are limits to arbitrage which hinder the exploitation of asset mispricing. These assumptions lead to an environment where market prices can differ from intrinsic value for protracted periods of time. Excessive optimism leads to overvaluation of assets. Arbitrage forces can eliminate profitable short-term trading strategies, but not longer run mispricing. Over longer horizons, the high sentiment that leads to overvaluation would be associated with low long-run returns as asset prices revert to intrinsic values.
We begin by partitioning the universe of investors into two groups. The first group, which we can think of as rational investors, we refer to as fundamentalists. This group has the property that they make an unbiased assessment of an asset's intrinsic value. The second group of investors are swayed by episodes of excessive optimism or pessimism. For convenience, we refer to this group as speculators. As a group, they tend to overvalue assets during times of extreme optimism, or high sentiment. When their sentiment is especially low, the group tends to undervalue assets.
Intuitively, we can think of the market price of an asset as reflecting a weighted average of the valuations of these two groups. More formally, this can come from a model such as Lintner (1969) . In that model, the heterogeneous judgments of investors aggregate to form market prices as we describe. Our setup amounts to a way of partitioning the investor universe in the Lintner model. In particular, for a set of assets in unit supply, the vector of asset prices is
where R f is the gross riskless return, α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, Ω is the belief of the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns, and µ i is the belief of the vector of asset payoffs (i = S for the speculators and F for the fundamentalists). We focus on the simplest case where both types of investors have identical risk aversion and estimates of Ω, but have different expectations of asset payoffs.
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Under these assumptions, the weights w S and w F are determined by the fraction of investors that are speculators versus fundamentalists. Clearly, if there are any speculators in the market and µ S > µ F then P > P F . Interpreting the fundamentalists as properly valuing the assets, this says the market price is above fundamentals when the speculators are overoptimistic. Our point in introducing this model is not to take it literally, but just to
show that the simple idea we posit is supported by formal models.
One question that arises is how the speculators can survive if they systematically misvalue assets. Here we appeal to limits to arbitrage. In the context of DSSW, our fundamentalists may recognize the market is overvalued, but still be unwilling to try to exploit the mispricing.
For example, portfolio managers may be evaluated annually, so they would be unwilling to take a position that may take longer to payoff. There is not a pure arbitrage opportunity since it is unknown when the market prices will converge back to the intrinsic value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show how agency problems between an arbitrageur and his source of capital can also hinder arbitrage. In their model, if a position moves against the arbitrageur the investors will withdraw some capital. But this is precisely when the arbitrageur needs capital to meet margin calls. The arbitrageur is potentially forced to liquidate the position at a loss, even though the expected return is even more attractive than when the position was initiated.
There are two main implications of the environment we describe. First, we should see market overvaluation when sentiment is high. The second implication is that, as the market price reverts to its intrinsic value, long-horizon returns following periods of high sentiment should be abnormally low. These predictions are a common thread in many models. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are two examples, although they have exogenous noise or sentiment traders. Several recent behavioral models model the source of noise more formally. In Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) investors are overconfident about their private signals and they incorrectly attribute successful outcomes to their own abilities, while blaming bad outcomes on chance ("biased self-attribution"). Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) have a model where earnings are a random walk, but investors mistakenly believe earnings switch between a mean-reverting regime and a growth regime. The investors are slow to update their beliefs about the regime in the face of new evidence ("conservatism"). At the same time, these investors think they see patterns where none exist ("representativeness"). Hong and Stein (1999) posit two groups of boundedly rational agents, "newswatchers" and "momentum traders." Newswatchers get private signals but ignore information in market prices. Slow transmittal of information causes prices to underreact in the short run. This underreaction leads to trading by the momentum investors. Overreaction results when the momentum investors have gone too far.
The primary aim of our paper is not to distinguish one of these theories from another.
Instead, our goal is to evaluate the broad predictions of behavioral theories relative to the null of rational pricing. Where appropriate, we make connections to specific behavioral models. In the analyses to follow we present three main tests of the implications laid out above. In each case we find strong support of these hypotheses. The tests are robust to controlling for rational factors that may be correlated with sentiment, and to modifications to the methodology.
Data
The results in the paper are based on a sample of monthly data. For the long-horizon regressions, the data start in January 1963 and end in December 2000 for a total of 456 observations. The analysis involving pricing errors is limited to the shorter sample of 235 observations from January 1979 to July 1998. the Dow was at 3,700, people were very pessimistic. We had two weeks in a row with 59% bears on our chart, the most bears in 12 and a half years. Meanwhile, the market was just getting ready to take off on a five-year rise. In August 1987, however, two months before the crash, the sentiment was overly optimistic, with bulls over 61% and the bears at 19%. So we look at this indicator in a contrarian way.
Sentiment
Our preferred sentiment variable is the "bull-bear spread" a common measure of sentiment in the popular press. 6 It is defined as the percentage of newsletters bullish minus the percentage bearish. Summary statistics for the bull-bear spread (S t ) over the two relevant sample periods are in Table 1 and the series is plotted in Figure 1 . Our choice of using the bull-bear spread as a measure of sentiment does not drive our results. As we discuss in Section 6, our results are robust to alternative variables using the Bull/Bear/Neutral data. In the pricing error analysis, we have data from Bakshi and Chen (2001) , who derive and estimate a discounted cash flow model with mean-reverting processes for earnings growth 7 Brown and Cliff (2002) find that both recent market returns and prior sentiment readings are important predictors of sentiment levels and changes. While they document a strong positive contemporaneous correlation between sentiment and market returns, they find no evidence of profitable short-run trading strategies.
8 We thank Ken French for providing these data and the SMB, HML, and UMD factors.
and interest rates. We use their pricing errors for each of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) as of July 1998. 9 As the composition of the Dow has changed over time, the stocks for which we have pricing errors do not exactly represent the actual DJIA.
In addition, not all the pricing errors are available back to January 1979. Consequently, we form an index which we call the "quasi-Dow" that uses the available stocks from this group.
In particular, for each month we value-weight the pricing errors on the stocks with pricing errors in that month. We also calculate the returns on this value-weighted index. The returns and pricing error series are then used to determine the log level of the market's valuation (p) and the log valuation level according to the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model (p * ). The working assumption is that the model valuation is a proxy for the intrinsic value of the index, and the market's deviation from this intrinsic value is a pricing error. It is of course possible that the "pricing error" p − p * is actually model misspecification, not mispricing. However, we will present evidence that this does not seem to be the predominant explanation for our results.
10 Figure 2 shows the (log) valuations for the market and the model. Both clearly move together over the long run, but there are substantial deviations for a year or more. Figure 1 shows the percentage pricing error along with the level of sentiment. The pricing errors make persistent swings around zero. The average pricing error is near zero, and the summary statistics in Panel B of Table 1 show that it is volatile and persistent. Figure 3 shows some properties of the pricing error and its relation to sentiment in the frequency domain.
Panel A is the spectral density of p − p * over various frequencies. This shows that most of the variability in the pricing errors is due to movements over the two to four year horizon, consistent with the swings in the pricing errors shown in Figure 1 lasting for several years.
Panel B of Figure 
Control Variables
In order to interpret our results as sentiment influencing future market valuations, we need to control for the information our sentiment variable may contain about rational factors.
Indeed, our sentiment variable will partially contain rational expectations based on risk factors and other variables that have been shown to predict future performance. When someone says they are bullish on the market, this can be a rational reflection of prosperous times to come, an irrational hope of the future, or some combination of the two. We want to focus on the irrational part of sentiment, so we include a set of control variables designed to capture this rational predictability. We acknowledge that it is possible we are missing some important rational factor, but we feel our set of control variables is a reasonable effort in mitigating this problem.
Our set of control variables are motivated by the conditional asset pricing literature.
We use the stochastically detrended one month US Treasury bill return [RF x; Campbell (1991) , Hodrick (1992) ], the difference in monthly returns on three month and one month T-bills [HB3; Campbell (1987), Ferson and Harvey (1991) ], the term spread as measured by the spread in yields on the 10 year US Treasury bond vs. three month T-bill [T S; Fama and French (1989) ], the default spread measured as the difference in yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds [DS; Keim and Stambaugh (1986) or Fama (1990) ], the dividend yield for the value-weighted CRSP index over the past twelve months [DY ; Fama and French (1988) , Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) ], and the rate of inflation [Inf l; Fama and Schwert (1977) , Sharpe (2002) ].
In addition to these variables, we include several of the popular factors in asset pricing models. Specifically, we also include the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, the premium on a portfolio of small stocks relative to large stocks (SM B), the premium on a portfolio of high book/market stocks relative to low book/market stocks (HM L), and the premium on a portfolio of past winners relative to losers (U M D). The market factor is based on the CAPM, while Fama and French (1993) show the SM B and HM L factors are incrementally useful. The momentum factor is based on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) . 
Sentiment and Long-Horizon Returns
Our first step in examining the impact of investor sentiment on asset valuations is to regress future k-period log returns on sentiment and the control variables (z t ),
As the length of the horizon increases, the number of observations in the regression drops, as does the number of independent observations. β(k) indicates the sensitivity of expected monthly returns over the horizon to investor sentiment. Under the null hypothesis that asset valuations are not influenced by behavioral forces, sentiment should not enter the regression significantly. Under the alternative hypothesis that optimism drives asset values above fundamental values and prices subsequently correct, β should be negative. Current optimism results in overvaluation, so future returns over the horizon would be lower than normal as the market valuation returns to its intrinsic value.
It turns out that careful implementation of this simple test is complicated. Long-horizon regressions are plagued by several econometric problems. The process of cumulating monthly returns, then running a regression with overlapping observations generates strong correlation in the residuals. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) provide standard errors that correct for this problem, but this correction does not perform well in finite samples [see Richardson and Stock (1989) , Richardson and Smith (1991) , Hodrick (1992) , or Boudoukh and Richardson (1994)] . A second problem is that the inclusion of persistent independent variables can bias the coefficient estimates since they are predetermined but not strictly exogenous [see Stambaugh (1999) ].
To circumvent these problems we use a bootstrap simulation. Details of the simulation are provided in the Appendix. In short, the simulation allows us to correct for the bias and use the appropriate critical values for inferences.
The results from the long-horizon regressions are collected in Tables 3 through 6. Each   table contains four panels, corresponding to horizons of 6, 12, 24, or 36 months. Within each panel are the results for each of the 36 portfolios, estimated separately. Table 3 reports the bias-adjusted coefficient estimates. They are almost universally negative as predicted by the alternative hypothesis and tend to be most negative for the larger firms and low book/market (growth) firms. A comparison of the panels shows that coefficients for horizons of a year or more are almost always more negative than those for the six month horizon. This pattern is consistent with limits to arbitrage hindering the ability of investors from profiting on mispricing that might persist for a significant amount of time. In unreported tables we also examine the regression R 2 and conventional t-statistics for the long-horizon regression. For R 2 , the general patterns are that predictability increases with horizon, although most of the increase comes in moving from 6 to 12 months. Predictability tends to be lowest for small and/or low book/market firms, although there is not a monotonic size or book/market relation. If we use Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors to form conventional t-statistics, the overall patterns of significance are similar to those reported in Table 4 . We find these t-statistics to be less reliable since the standard errors are are based on the empirical distributions obtained from the simulation. The test statistic is constructed as the bias-adjusted coefficient divided by the standard deviation (across simulations) of the coefficient estimate. We find these statistics adhere very closely to the standard normal distribution (Panel A of Figure 4 provides an illustration). Note that we use two-tailed tests, although the alternative hypothesis justifies one-sided tests. Significance using one-sided tests are twice as strong as what is reported in the tables.
The pattern of significance basically matches the magnitude of the coefficients. For larger firms or low book/market firms, sentiment is a significant predictor of future returns at the one-, two-, or three-year horizon. Since these portfolios represent most of the market capitalization, 12 the market portfolio is also significantly affected by sentiment (significant at the 5% level for one and two years, and 1% level for three years). That these portfolios are the ones most influenced by sentiment is interesting in light of the conventional wisdom that sentiment would most affect smaller stocks. Perhaps one reason for the lack of significance for smaller stocks is that the sentiment variable we use applies to the market as a whole: the newsletters on which our variable is based are forecasts for the overall market. Thus, it may be the case that sentiment does more strongly affect small stocks, just that our sentiment data do not allow us to address this. It seems plausible that growth firms are more influenced by sentiment than value firms since they are typically more difficult to value. If there are not well-established valuation benchmarks then investors may be more likely to follow the pack.
Since the results across horizons are correlated, it is most appropriate to judge significance based on a joint test of the coefficients. Table 5 provides Wald tests of the null that β(6) = β(12) = β(24) = β(36) = 0 for a given portfolio. These tests confirm that large and/or value stocks are significantly related to sentiment, as is the market portfolio.
often poorly behaved. This results in many extreme statistics in the simulation, which make the empirical critical values large in magnitude (Panel A of Figure 4) . Still, the large size, low book/market firms and the overall market portfolio have significant coefficients at the 5-10% level. These tables are not reported to conserve space, but are available upon request. 12 Fama and French (1993 , Table 1 ) report that the two portfolios with the stocks in largest capitalization quintile and lowest two book/market quintiles account for 46% of the overall market capitalization.
In order to understand the economic magnitude of the coefficients on sentiment, it is helpful to refer to Table 6. This table takes the bias-adjusted coefficient and multiplies it by the horizon and the standard deviation of sentiment (22%). The values in the table indicate the effect of a one standard deviation increase in sentiment on the return over the indicated horizon (in percent). For example, a one standard deviation increase in sentiment is associated with a reduction in the return on the large size, low book/market portfolio of 7.1% over a two-year period. The average (simple) two-year return for this portfolio is about 25%, so this is an economically significant reduction. Moreover, it is not so severe as to be implausible. Even if institutional investors are aware that future returns may be reduced by 7%, they may not be willing to try to exploit this mispricing since this is not an arbitrage opportunity. There is a very real chance the position may move against them in the interim, and they are likely to have their performance evaluated before this "convergence" strategy is expected to payoff.
Sentiment and Pricing Errors
In this section we perform two types of analyses to examine the impact of sentiment on asset valuation. Both analyses rely on the pricing errors from the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model which we use to form a market valuation and model valuation for a quasi-Dow index.
The first test is simply to regress the pricing errors e t = Pt−P * t P * t (market minus model) on sentiment and the control variables. The second test exploits the fact that the market and model valuations should be cointegrated.
Pricing Errors Regressions
The simple question we have in mind is, "Can sentiment explain the pricing errors?" We start by regressing the pricing errors on a constant, sentiment, and the return on the quasi-Dow,
The last variable is used as a control to pick up misspecification of the model. For example, if the model inputs such as earnings growth forecasts are delayed due to reporting lags, the market price might react to that information before the model. This would show up in both the pricing error and the return.
As the pricing errors are highly persistent (autocorrelation of 0.9), serial correlation in the regression residuals is a problem. We correct for this serial correlation in three ways. First, we use a Newey and West (1987) correction with 24 lags. This type of correction may not be adequate when the residuals are highly autocorrelated so we also use the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and maximum likelihood with AR(1) errors.
The results of these regression are in Table 7 . The row labeled ρ indicates the autocorrelation of the residuals for the Newey-West regression, and the estimated autocorrelation coefficient in the other two regressions. For all three of these regressions ρ is 0.89, and the t-stats of 29 indicate it is highly significant. 13 For simplicity, most of the discussion below focuses on the Cochrane-Orcutt regression (the maximum likelihood regression is nearly identical). For all three regressions the coefficient on sentiment is positive and significant (t-stat of 3.5, or 1.8 for the Newey-West regression). The positive sign is as expected. When investors are optimistic, the market valuation is higher than the intrinsic value.
The first three regressions leave open the possibility that the sentiment variable is simply picking up some other rational factors. We therefore include the set of control variables from the long-horizon regressions,
Even in the presence of the control variables, the coefficient on sentiment is positive and significant in all three regressions (t-stat is 2.8, or 2.2 for the Newey-West regression). Although we don't interpret the control variables individually, they do increase the adjusted R 2 and the default spread and dividend yield enter significantly.
The pricing error regressions show that, even controlling for common factors associated with rational asset pricing, some mispricing is explained by investor sentiment. This finding is robust to various forms of serial correlation correction and to alternative regression specifications. We next explore this issue with another approach to see if we obtain the same conclusions.
Cointegration
A cointegrated system is one in which two (or more) variables are individually integrated, but a linear combination of those variables is not integrated. We have a very natural environment for such a system. Since the market value of an index can be viewed as the sum of permanent shocks (and a drift), it is reasonable to expect that it is integrated. By the same logic the intrinsic (model) value of the index should be integrated as well. Yet the difference of the log series should not have permanent components. That is p − p * should be integrated of order zero, making p and p * cointegrated with cointegrating vector [1 − 1] . The error correction interpretation of cointegration says that when the market is overvalued, it will adjust toward its equilibrium value based on the sensitivity to the error p − p * .
In this section we explore this idea. We first establish that p and p * are cointegrated, then estimate the error correction representation of the cointegrating regressions. In these regressions we include sentiment and the control variables to see if sentiment can explain any of the deviations from intrinsic value.
To test for the integration of p and p * we estimate augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions including a constant, a time trend, and twelve lags of changes to the dependent variable to correct for serial correlation. 14 Panel A of Table 8 contains the results for this test. The null of integration is not rejected for p. For p * the null of integration is rejected at the 10% level, although integration is not rejected at alternative lag lengths in the ADF test. Given the strong a priori theoretical reasoning for integration of p * , the fairly weak evidence against the null, and the sensitivity to the choice of lags, we proceed assuming that the intrinsic value series is also integrated.
We next test for cointegration in two ways. Given our strong theoretical prior on the cointegrating vector we follow the recommendation of Hamilton (1994, p. 582) and estimate the ADF regressions for p − p * . In this regression a time trend is not included since the errors do not appear to drift up over time (see Figure 1) 
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Having established the cointegration of these series, we then assess whether sentiment is marginally significant when added to the error correction version of the cointegrating regression. In particular, we estimate
15 The cointegrating vectors for the other regressions in Table 9 are not materially different from [1 − 1] so they are not reported.
16 Likelihood ratio or AIC tests for model order of the VAR indicate one lag is appropriate. The BIC test favors two lags. 17 We do not report the Johansen test for the null of less than one cointegrating relationship. Rejection of this null would mean both variables are I(0). In every instance we fail to reject this hypothesis, supporting cointegration of p and p * .
and ∆p
The coefficient γ 1 represents the correction of p t+1 to the error p t + θ 1 p * t and [1 θ 1 ] is the cointegrating vector.
The results of these regressions are in Table 9 . One pair of regressions excludes the control variables, the other pair includes them.
18 The first two columns are for the regressions with ∆p as the dependent variable. In either case sentiment is positive and highly significant.
This indicates that when investors are optimistic the market valuation tends to be high, controlling for the intrinsic value and (possibly) other variables to proxy for rational factors.
The last two columns in the plagued by misspecification, or that we have not adequately controlled for the rational part of sentiment. The regression without controls shows the sentiment coefficient is negative and significant, but we already have seen that sentiment captures some of the information in the control variables. Thus, the negative relation may simply be due to the information in these control variables, which should be related to the intrinsic value. When we include the controls in the regression, there is no longer a significant relation. Therefore we conclude that the ability of sentiment to explain pricing errors is driven by its relation with p and not
In summary, this section attacks from two fronts the issue of whether sentiment affects the level of asset values. We find strong evidence that sentiment can explain deviations from intrinsic value even when controlling for rational factors. In addition, we show in a cointegration framework that sentiment is significantly related to the level of market valuation. In either approach, the results indicate that when investors are optimistic, the market valuation often exceeds the intrinsic value.
Robustness
We undertake a host of robustness checks to examine if our results are driven by some admittedly arbitrary choices. We first consider a variety of alternative proxies for investor sentiment. Many of these have been examined previously in the literature so we seek to show that our variable provides some incremental information. We then consider reasonable alternatives to the way in which we construct our sentiment variable. Finally, we discuss some other checks we have done to control for endogeneity and to examine robustness to the choice of rational asset pricing model used to measure pricing errors.
Alternative Sentiment Proxies
As discussed in the Introduction, a number of other researchers have considered alternative proxies for investor sentiment. Although few of these papers directly explore the valuation and long-horizon issues which we concentrate on, it is important to provide evidence that our measure of sentiment is not simply picking up previously-documented results.
We consider seven alternative sentiment proxies, several of which have been explicitly used in this capacity in the literature.
19 First, we consider the discount on closed-end funds (CEFD). The role of this variable has been the source of considerable controversy as witnessed by the paper by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and the response by Chen, Kan, and Miller (1993) . Second, we examine the ratio of NYSE odd-lot sales to purchases (ODD). Third, we employ net mutual fund flows (FUNDFLOW) which measures the actual investment behavior of individual investors. These three variables have also been examined by Neal and Wheatley (1998) over long-horizons and we compare our results to theirs below.
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19 To conserve space we define these variables only briefly here. Interested readers are referred to Brown and Cliff (2002) for a more complete discussion.
20 Neal and Wheatley (1998) use annual data from 1933-1993 for closed-end fund discounts and from 1960-1993 for net mutual fund flows.
FUNDCASH measures the proportion of aggregate mutual fund assets that are held as cash.
All else equal, bearish fund managers will have large cash positions.
21 Next, we consider the ARMS Index, a popular measure of market sentiment among technical analysts. It is reported daily in the Wall Street Journal, which indicates that "Generally, an ARMS of less than 1.00 indicates buying demand; above 1.00 indicates selling pressure." Finally, we consider two IPO-related variables. IPON measures the number of IPOs during the month.
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2002) suggest firms time their issues during "hot-markets,"
which are times of excessive optimism. IPORET is the monthly average of first-day IPO returns which has similarly been suggested as a sentiment measure. the economic significance of the sentiment proxies from the long-horizon regression analysis for the small-and large-capitalization portfolios (results for the value-weighted market are similar to the large stock portfolio and are not included in the table). We find no evidence that the closed-end fund discount is related to subsequent stock returns. Neal and Wheatley (1998) find a significant relation for small stocks or a portfolio long small stocks and short large stocks. However, their results are weaker when also controlling for the average price of small stocks. Consistent with Neal and Wheatley (1998), we find little evidence that the odd-lot ratio can predict future returns. For FUNDFLOW, we find a significant positive relation to future returns on the large-size portfolio. The relation for the small-size portfolio is also positive, but weaker statistically. The positive coefficient indicates high long-run returns following cash inflows. Neal and Wheatley (1998) find a significantly negative relation for the small-size portfolio and the size premium. The sign for their large-size portfolio is consistent with ours, but is insignificant. Perhaps our results differ from Neal and Wheatley (1998) due to the sample period or our inclusion of additional control variables. Overall, our results do not provide much support for the view that these variables do a good job of measuring sentiment.
Several of the other variables in the long-horizon regression are significant. FUNDCASH is positively related to the returns on large stocks. Apparently, as fund managers are holding large cash positions, the market performs well going forward. The results indicate the IPO variables are negatively related to small stock returns. IPON is jointly significant at the 10% level, while IPORET is significant at the 1% level. Small stocks appear to do poorly following these proxies for hot markets.
Panel B summarizes the results from the quasi-Dow pricing error regressions (based on the Cochrane-Orcutt regressions). The first row of the panel is for regressions without the control variables, the second row uses the control variables. In every instance, the coefficients are insignificant.
Panel C shows the sentiment coefficients from the ∆p portion of the cointegration analysis.
Again, the table shows the results with and without the control variables. In several cases the sentiment proxies are related to pricing errors when the control variables are not included (ODD, FUNDFLOW, FUNDCASH, and ARMS). However, most of this evidence appears to be due to common variation with the control variables. After including the control variables, only FUNDFLOW and ARMS remain significant.
To summarize our findings on the robustness to alternative sentiment proxies, our survey data do withstand the test. Although several of the proxies are significant in the longhorizon regressions or the cointegration analysis, none of the proxies exhibits such strong and clear significance as does our survey data. When including all variables together, our survey data retains its significance. 22 There is no denying that there is some overlap in the 22 We explore two ways of using the various proxies simultaneously. First, we repeat the three analyses by simply using the survey data and all proxies at once. In the long horizon regression, our sentiment variable remains significant. In the pricing error analysis the survey sentiment variable remains significant with or without the control variables. None of the other proxies are significant in either regression. The survey sentiment variable is also significant in the cointegration analysis, although several other proxies are significant as well (CEFD, ODD, FUNDFLOW, IPON, and ARMS). The second approach is to regress survey sentiment on the proxies and rerun each analysis first with the fitted value from the regression and then with the regression residuals. The fitted value picks up the common variation between the survey data information contained in our variable with these other proxies. However, it appears that our variable effectively captures much of the common information and also provides incremental explanatory power.
Construction of the Sentiment Variable
The next issue we address is whether our construction of the sentiment variable drives the results. Unfortunately there is no theoretically correct way of formulating a sentiment index from the survey data on the fraction Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral. Our choice of the Bull-Bear spread is based solely on its popularity among technical analysts and the financial press. Consequently, we define four other measures based on the same underlying survey data. First, we consider the fraction of Bulls to those with an opinion, Bull/(Bull+Bear).
Second, we consider a pair of measures, Neutral and Bull-Bear. By including Neutral as a second variable, we are able to distinguish between cases where there is indifference versus cases where there is strong disagreement (e.g., the Bull-Bear spread is the same if investors are all Neutral, or if bulls and bears are split 50/50). Third, we consider using Neutral/(Bull+Bear) and the Bull-Bear spread. Scaling Neutral in this way puts more emphasis on the observations with extreme neutrality. Finally, we split the Bull-Bear spread into positive and negative values. We discuss this subsequently in the next subsection so we skip it here.
The results of the three analyses are summarized in Table 11 . Panel A shows that all variants of bullish sentiment remain significant in the long-horizon regressions. For the two cases with a version of neutrality, there is little evidence that neutrality is significant. Finally, Panel C shows the results for the market mispricing part of the cointegration. The significance of the bullish sentiment variables remains intact, but there is some weak evidence and the other proxies, while the residual contains the information in the survey data that is incremental to the other proxies. The fitted value is significant in the long-horizon regression and the cointegration analysis, but insignificant in the pricing error regressions. The residual is significant in the pricing error regressions, but not the cointegration analysis or the long-horizon regressions.
that high neutrality is related to drops in the market. In particular, for the regression using Neutral and Bull-Bear and including the control variables the t-stat on the neutrality coefficient is -2.04. Replacing Neutral with Neutral/(Bull+Bear) reduces the t-stat to -1.68.
In summary, it does not appear that our choice of defining sentiment as the BullBear spread drives our results. Any combination of two of the three categories of optimism produces similar results.
23 It is probably possible to construct variables using the Bull/Bear/Neutral information that performs "better" than our simple Bull-Bear spread.
However, our goal is not to fish for the variable(s) that best explains the data (in sample), but to show that our results are robust to this choice.
Asymmetric Response to Optimism and Pessimism
Empirical evidence on momentum and reversals [see for example Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)], as well as implications of the behavioral theories, suggest that the importance of sentiment may be asymmetric. One reason for this has to do with limits to arbitrage. Practical limitations to short-selling activity may make it difficult for rational investors to prevent market prices from being pushed above intrinsic value during periods of excessive optimism.
On the other hand, when some investors are especially pessimistic, there are no similar frictions preventing arbitrageurs from taking the necessary long position. 24 A second source of asymmetry has to do with the direct implication of the DHS model that overconfidence drives investors to overreact to private information. Overvaluation (undervaluation) will tend to follow a string of good (bad) news. Gervais and Odean (2001) show that, because investors are net long in equities, aggregate overconfidence tends to occur following gains.
Taken together, these implications suggest an asymmetric relation between sentiment and valuations.
25
Case 4 in Table 11 
Other Robustness Checks
We offer brief comments on other robustness checks we have done. One concern is that the endogeneity between sentiment and market valuations may influence our pricing error We also examine robustness to the valuation model used to form pricing errors. We have pricing errors on the S&P 500 Index from both the Bakshi and Chen (2001) 
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a direct survey measure of investor sentiment predicts market returns over the next one to three years and that this measure has the ability to explain deviations from intrinsic value as measured by other researchers' models of stock prices. In all cases, the significance of our results is robust to controlling for rational factors and to changes in the methodology.
There are (at least) two ways to interpret these findings. The more conservative interpretation is that we have identified some new factor related to asset valuation. This factor may be derived from investors' rational outlook for the market or from some other origin altogether, for example, unidentified risk factors. Regardless of the interpretation, our sentiment variable forecasts market returns over the next several years and helps to explain mispricings from a rigorous valuation model.
The bolder interpretation is that we have actually used an accurate measure of investor of the paper are quarterly, but he has provided a monthly sample. 27 The S&P pricing errors from the Bakshi and Chen (2001) model fail the test for cointegration. The Sharpe (2002) errors pass the cointegration tests. sentiment and this measure is related to the level of stock prices. This finding has several important implications. First and foremost, our results support the important yet controversial behavioral theories that predict the irrational sentiments of investors do in fact affect asset price levels. Second, this suggests asset pricing models should consider the role of investor sentiment. Third, market regulators and government officials should be concerned about the potential for market bubbles or "irrational exuberance" if a sudden change in sentiment translates into a negative wealth shock that depresses economic activity. Finally, individual investors should be aware of the impact sentiment can have on both their own and money managers' investment strategies.
Appendix Simulation Details
We regress k-period returns on sentiment and control variables,
(A.1) r t+1 is the log return from month t to t + 1 and z t is the vector of predictive variables known at time t. The use of overlapping observations induces a MA(k − 1) structure in the residuals under the null that ε (1) is serially uncorrelated. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) propose a correction for this induced correlation.
There are two main problems with the regression in (A.1). First, there is a bias in the coefficient estimates since they include persistent independent variables which are predetermined, but not strictly exogenous. Second, Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors do not perform well when the degree of overlap is "large" relative to the sample size. Therefore, we perform a simulation to account for the bias and to adjust the critical values used in inference.
The simulation estimates a VAR(1) for y t = [r t S t z t ] . 28 The null hypothesis that sentiment does not predict returns is imposed on the coefficient matrix by setting the appropriate element to zero. The constant in the constrained model is adjusted to restore the original mean, and the residuals from the constrained model are saved. We bootstrap the residuals from the calibration regressions to account for heteroskedasticity and generate and discard an additional 100 observations to remove any start-up effects. At each replication the 456 simulated observations are used to form long-horizon returns and estimate (A.1) at each of the horizons. The coefficients at iteration i are saved along with the corresponding Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. This process is repeated for 10,000 artificial datasets to get a distribution of theβ(k)'s.
We calculate t-stats for the test that β(k) = 0 by subtracting the bias and dividing by the standard deviation of the coefficient estimates. That is, the t-stat at the i th iteration for horizon k is
whereβ i (k) and std(β i (k)) indicate the mean and standard deviation of theβ i (k)'s across the 10,000 simulations. We find that t-statistics constructed in this fashion perform much better than those obtained by using the standard error of the coefficient. Table 1 : Summary Statistics Panel A contains summary statistics for sentiment and the control variables used in the longhorizon regressions. Panel B contains the summary statistics for sentiment, the log pricing error on the "quasi-Dow" (p − p * ), and the monthly return on the quasi-Dow (R Dow ) for a shorter subsample. Panel B data are used in the pricing error regressions and cointegration regressions. The quasi-Dow is a value-weighted index we create using all available firms for which Bakshi and Chen (2001) have pricing errors. The variables are sentiment (S), the detrended interest rate (RFx), the difference in returns on three-and one-month T-bills (HB3), term spread (TS), default spread (DS), inflation (Infl), the Fama and French (1993) factors (ExMkt, SMB, and HML) and a momentum factor (UMD ( Table 10 : Alternative Sentiment Proxies This table summarizes the key results using alternative measures of sentiment. CEFD is the closed-end fund discount, ODD is the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases, FUNDFLOW is the net flow of funds into mutual funds, FUNDCASH is the percentage of mutual fund assets held as cash, IPON is the number of IPOs during the month, IPORET is the first-day return on IPOs during the month, and ARMS is the ARMS Index. Panel A shows the economic magnitude of a one standard deviation increase in sentiment on the cumulative return over the period for either the small-or large-size quintiles. The panel also shows the p-value for the test of joint significance across horizons. The long-horizon regressions include control variables, not shown to conserve space, and use the simulations discussed in Appendix A. Panel B shows the coefficient on the sentiment variable in the pricing error regressions for the quasi-Dow, as in Table 7 . Panel C reports the sentiment coefficient in the error correction cointegration regression, similar to the ∆p columns of Table 9 . In Panels B and C, the results are reported for regressions with and without the control variables (z). In all panels, a, b, and c superscripts indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Case 3 uses the percentage Neutral divided by the percentage with a view, along with the Bull-Bear spread. Case 4 splits the sentiment measure into positive and negative values. Panel A shows the economic magnitude of a one standard deviation increase in sentiment on the cumulative return on the value-weighted market over the period. a, b, and c superscripts indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The long-horizon regressions include control variables, not shown to conserve space, and use the simulations discussed in Appendix A. Panel B shows the sentiment coefficients and t-statistics based on the CochraneOrcutt quasi-Dow pricing error regressions, similar to Table 7 . Panel C shows the sentiment coefficients and t-statistics from the cointegration analysis, as in the ∆p columns of Table 9 . In Panels B and C the first two columns are without the control variables (z), the last two columns include the control variables. Figure 1: Pricing Errors and Sentiment This figure shows the pricing error on the "quasi-Dow" index and investor sentiment, measured as percentages. The quasi-Dow is a value-weighted index we create using all available firms for which Bakshi and Chen (2001) . The quasi-Dow is a value-weighted index we create using all available firms for which Bakshi and Chen (2001) have pricing errors. Data are monthly from January 1979 through July 1998. 
